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Abstract
The paper aims to explain and evaluate two key features
of Securing Good Care for Older People, the Wanless
Report on alternative mechanisms for funding long-term
care of older people. One is the new elements of the
methodology for evaluating the alternatives (section 1.1).
The paper argues that more successfully than previously
and analyses in other countries, these elements focus atten-
tion on what are really the core issues: the means and ends
which are the unique foci of long-term care, and estimates
of the consequences of alternatives for them. By doing so,
the report faces the politicians and policy analysis and
research communities with a formidable challenge, to
master and contribute to the development of the new
framework and evidence. Failure to meet the challenge will
increases the risk that the policy system will reinforce
rather than weaken causes of gross inequity and ineffi-
ciency caused by the under-funding of long-term care
seemingly unanswerably demonstrated by the report. The
second key feature is the type of funding model the Report
recommends given expected changes in the balance
between demands and public expenditure. Section 1.2
argues that the report’s analysis as successfully transforms
the state of the argument about this as much as about the
framework, methodology and evidence for evaluating alter-
natives, demonstrating the relative weakness of models
widely advocated a decade ago. Part 2 discusses how to
build on the Report. Section 2.1 discusses the framing of
issues and the analysis of evidence for each of the key foci
of the report’s main contribution to evaluation methodol-
ogy. Section 2.2 discusses whether the recommended
model would be the wisest choice given the environment
likely during the next few decades. 
Introduction
In every generation, a few reports redefine issues of current
moment in a way which could set the framework for
evidence-based discourse, often for a long period. This is
so of the report of the Wanless team’s review (hereafter
WR) (Wanless et al., 2006). It will have less impact than
it should unless this is widely enough recognised not just
in academe but far beyond. And its most important contri-
butions are precisely those whose application in other
countries could advance their discourse also. 
In particular, it engages the means and ends which are
really at the heart of long-term care debate. Starting with
quantified descriptions of what levels, balance and inci-
dence of outcomes are most valued by citizens (and are the
declared aims of policy intervention), and how they can be
most fairly and efficiently produced, it works back to
resources and costs and who would pay how much for what
value of benefit given each of a set of exemplar funding
models. It shows that some model types could not suffi-
ciently satisfy enough of the general criteria to play anything
more than a supporting role, if that. The patterns of benefit
differ from one another and so confer varying ratios of bene-
fits to costs to groups though much the same in effectiveness
judged by the most general of the WR criteria, but likely
to attract different advocates. As the models have been
designed and parameterised by WR, the ‘partnership model’
has the edge, it argues. 
It provides this key insight without neglecting the many
criteria which recent analyses recognise should affect judg-
ments about systems in policy and political processes, from
the broadest principles to the most focussed analyses of costs
and benefits by subgroups of the population. Analyses of
the properties of model types, indeed of multiple exemplars
of parameterised models of each of several types (as with
the analysis of costs and the incidence of costs and bene-
fits on groups defined in various ways), have been
transformed in their sophistication and detail. But it is the
WR which is the first internationally to fill the key gap: to
provide a methodology for evaluating alternative funding
mechanisms starting from quantitative evidence about
citizen’s valuations for the specific benefits which are the
raison d’être of long term care policy and quantitative
knowledge about how to produce them most efficiently.
Think of the alternative: without this WR methodology, we
are doomed to asking partially irrelevant questions and
providing only partially relevant evidence to answer them,
not the ones directly about the ends and means which the
policy process has honed in its long learning experience.
Without it, we should be able to compare funding models
by their outcomes for the income, educational, cultural
minority, gender, social class, and many other relevant
distributions of costs to public and private funds and the
monetary costs of services received. But we should be
unable to compare their distributions of public and private
costs and the value of the net benefits of care as these are
perceived by potential beneficiaries for groups defined by
the need criteria of long-term care in general, and the policy
paradigm for social care in particular. 
The application of this new methodology makes WR’s case
a formidable challenge. The WR framework assembles key
new components, some the basis of publications only during
the last decade or so. Although the argument it bases on
them is itself sophisticated, and based on complex models
and detailed analysis of large amounts of evidence, above
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all it suggests the great practical benefits from strengthen-
ing the knowledge base. It is all the more a challenge to
those seeking to create the knowledge it needs because
crossing boundaries between intellectual communities is
difficult, uncomfortable and risky, and it is dangerous to
narrow readerships by using argument whose basis is analy-
sis which many cannot follow: gurus chant KISS – Keep it
Simple and Sequential. But in this field the public interest
demands that we do the opposite. And requisite engagement
of the complexity is a challenge not just to those advanc-
ing knowledge but also to the higher official with many other
concerns than this, the policy analyst in a pressure group,
the specialist journalist, and politicians.
It would greatly handicap policy development were insuf-
ficient policy leaders, analysts and others to learn to
understand and use the new frameworks and methods. What
would be tragic would be for people not to attempt to
contribute to the new argument. Hence the form and content
of the paper. It is to help the reader understand some essen-
tials of the WR framework and argument and how to
improve it and discuss how the momentum can be main-
tained. 
1. Analytic framework and evaluation
methodology 
The Wanless team’s key methodological contribution to the
evaluation of alternative funding models has been to combine
quantified knowledge about the levels and mixes of
outcomes from mixes of services with citizen valuations of
the levels of outcomes. WR did so in two stages of the
analysis, each a breakthrough for the discussion of the WR
topic. The first was to develop a methodology for setting
a threshold level for the outcomes obtained from an incre-
ment of cost to public funds above which subsidy should be
made. The second was to provide a methodology for
comparing the relative benefits given costs from alternative
models (weighting benefits by older people’s valuations of
them). That methodology was key to the final stage of the
evaluation of funding mechanisms. 
1.1 Threshold value above which subsidise 
The threshold is based on the selection of a value of the
increase in benefit obtained from the service obtained using
an increment of subsidy; that is, an incremental benefit/cost
ratio.1 The selection is based on incremental benefit/cost
ratios in competing policy areas, reflecting estimates of the
threshold beyond citizens would not be willing to pay for
additional gain. 
ADLAY: a generic measure of the value of outcomes. The
value of the benefit is a generic indicator of welfare of the
kinds which social care is intended to produce. WR’s
generic indicator is the value of outcomes of services
intended to compensate for limitations in activities of daily
living due to disability, either physical or mental. The esti-
mate of benefits is for the year. So the Report calls the
generic indicator the ADLAY, the ADL-adjusted year. 
The estimation of incremental benefit/cost ratios requires
both a) knowledge about how outcomes differ given vari-
ation in the costs of inputs, other things being equal – what
economists call the ‘production function’, and b) valuations
of outcome levels to use as weights to compute the overall
value of benefits. 
Production functions. Figure 1 reproduces WR’s illustra-
tion of a (‘reduced form’ of the) production function for
one outcome and one service, for the contribution of home
care to ‘producing’ extra time supported in the community,
from the ECCEP study which estimated production relations
for 19 outcomes of value in their own right (Davies,
Fernandez and Nomer, 2000). The figure illustrates the
shape of the mathematical form most commonly describing
the effects of variations in service levels on outcomes.2
The effects of increments of input are smaller as input
levels increase.3 The figure also illustrates that the effects
of the services depend greatly on circumstances of users and
carers, a result consonant with the predictability of outcomes
from risk factors. The patterns confirm the importance of
using production function techniques, incorporating
equation forms which allow theoretically likely complex
forms to reveal themselves.4 Estimates for social care do
indeed have several of these features, illustrating why
attempts to estimate the relations between service levels
and mixes (and costs) and outcomes often yield absurd
results.5
Outcome dimensions. WR used OPUS as a tool for
outcome measurement and the value weighting of outcomes
(Netten et al., 2005). The outcome domains used in the WR
analysis were: personal care and comfort; social participa-
tion and involvement; control over daily life; meals and
nutrition; safety; accommodation; employment and occu-
pation; role support (as carer or parent), and being in their
own home.6
The selection of OPUS was politically shrewd, because
OPUS was originally influenced by the assumptive worlds
of those faced with balancing needs and the allocation of
public spending of a period which was more pessimistic
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
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Figure 1: Effects of home care and day care on the extra
time an older person remains in the community 
about the balance between needs and resources than that of
earlier classifications of outcome and their indicators.7 What
is key for avoiding biased estimates and a balanced descrip-
tion is that it should include all important outcomes. Some
to which the attention of some in the policy world wavered
as spending grew more slowly than demands was user
morale, the probability and severity of the sub-clinical and
clinical depression which between them are so prevalent in
the population at risk (Davenand et al., 1996; Livingston
et al., 1996, Saunders et al., 1993, and their carers (Buck
et al., 2002). Improvements in them are outcomes valued
in their own right.8 Some early British argument was that
the production of morale effects for many (as means, ends
or by-products) were hallmarks of high quality and efficient
systems, with enhanced user influence on the prioritisation
of ends and choice of means being important in the causal
process (Davies and Challis, 1986; Davies and Missiakoulis,
1988). More recent research differentiates good from bad
commissioning and service quality by referring to related
causal processes (Patmore, 2006; Sinclair et al., 2000).
More directly, modelling research on substantial data from
a variety of areas suggest that during the nineties, the
reforms caused services to produce substantial outcomes for
morale and depression-associated variables.9
The same (or co-produced and highly correlated) effects are
once again highly valued in policy statements. Despite fiscal
stringency10 whose effects at the local level has been well
documented by user, professional and local government
interest groups and others (Health and Care News, 2007;
CSCI, 2006), the green paper of 2005 (DH, 2005) coura-
geously made a political commitment to goals related to
morale, wellbeing and associated concepts: courageously –
because it thereby made the widening gap between aspira-
tions and achievements the focus of public attention –
including the consequences of the targeting consequences
of stringency that the Commission for Social Care Inspection
[CSCI] has promised to ‘focus on in its report for 2006–07’
(Carson, 2006; CSCI, 2006c, LGA, 2006, 2007). So these
goals now have a higher policy priority during the mid00s
than such goals had among hard-pressed managers at the
end of the previous decade, giving them an importance
closer to that in some other leading countries from the mid
1980s.11
In this respect, the new policy statements of the mid-00s
are closer to the articulation of the social care paradigm in
1989 and 1990 in Caring for People, the associated guid-
ance papers (especially those for field managers and
workers; DH, 1990a, b), and the literature which first
included morale, wellbeing, and life satisfaction as outcome
criteria.13 The green paper Independence Wellbeing and
Choice (DH, 2005) made much of the wellbeing agenda and
specified a key role for Directors of Adult Social Care. The
outcome goals from the Green Paper were reflected in crite-
ria of quality developed by the CSCI (2006). One of the
outcome domains is ‘Quality of Life’, another ‘Improved
Health and Emotional Wellbeing’. The latter was elaborated
with, inter alia, the statement that that ‘emotional and
mental health needs are responded to and appropriately
addressed’ (CSCI 2006, pp.7–10). 
The WR methodology is being rapidly developed. Though
OPUS does not have the equivalent of a morale dimension
per se, its developers are ‘committed to seeking to cover
all the consequences of the impairment disability or hand-
icap due to all causes (physical, cognitive impairment, other
mental health problem) for the performance of key personal
care and ‘instrumental acts of daily living in the circum-
stances of users and carers.’ Therefore work is in progress
to develop a morale dimension, and as far as statistically
possible to map existing OPUS dimensions onto all CSCI
domains. WR applied both the narrower ‘core business’
concept and a broader concept attempting to cover wellbe-
ing. But by presenting estimates for stringently defined core
business alone as well as the broader concept, WR could
not be accused of Utopian optimism about the ease with
which allocations of public spending to social care could
be raised. 
Valuation of outcome dimensions. The relative value of
increments of each output must be weighted to derive the
total value of outcomes required for broad allocation judge-
ments. The valuations used by WR were derived for a
sample of older citizens, only some of whom were users.
A sample of older people was selected partly because it was
assumed that they would be aware of the issues. Results
showed that preferences were asssociated with user and
carer circumstances; and in particular, with whether they
had actually had experience of the services.
Selecting the threshold to equalise costs of values
across policy votes. It would strengthen the basis for
allocations across policy areas competing for a share of
the same budget to be able to compare the benefit/cost
ratios for each area’s marginal expenditures. The inven-
tion of the ADLAY does this. The QALY, an analogous
generic indicator for health outcomes is widely applied.
Most famously, it is used by NICE, the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence, in the evaluation of new phar-
maceuticals and treatments. WR set the threshold
maximum cost per ADLAY at £20 thousand. The Chair
of NICE recently commented that ‘anything around
about £20,000 per QALY is likely to be regarded as
cost-effective. Beyond about £30,000 per QALY, we
wouldn’t necessarily say ‘no’, but you’ve got to have
14
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Figure 2: Outcome gains from home care services 
Personal care,
nutrition and
safety
All care outcomes
better . . . reasons for saying “yes”’ (Rawlins, 2007). He
related these thresholds to estimates of approximately
£32,000 for the value of a lost life because of a road
accident averted by public spending. He described how
there were exceptional circumstances in which NICE had
approved pharmaceuticals whose costs per QALY were
much greater: for instance, Riluzol, which ‘avoids the
need for tracheotomy for about six months for victims
of Motor Neurone Disease... [because] people with
tracheotomy say it’s almost worse than death’, and for
which NICE’s estimate of the costs per QALY was
approximately £38,000.13
WR was shrewd to base the threshold on an ADLAY
concept and to choose £20,000 per ADLAY as the thresh-
old. The subsidy to social care being paid from the vote of
the DH, NHS heads are adult social care’s closest competi-
tors in the budgeting process. The ADLAY is designed to
be a close analogue of the QALY, and the QALY is the
accepted generic indicator of the value of health care
outcomes. Given that NICE would almost take for granted
that additional public expenditures yielding a QALY for
£20,000 would be cost-effective, it would seem difficult for
government to deny special funding approval for forms of
social care expenditure with a cost per ADLAY consider-
ably exceeding £20,000 in circumstances in which it would
relieve situations judged to be ‘almost worse than death’.
What about some manifestations and stages of dementia
about which The Guardian (2007) wrote ‘for those directly
afflicted, the unremitting erosion of independence can
resemble torture’?14
Of course, for this argument to hold, it has to be broadly
accepted that an ADLAY is roughly equivalent in value to
a QALY, and that estimates of costs per ADLAY and per
QALY are valid and reliable enough to provide a useful if
crude guide. Results of the research mapping QALY and
other generic indicators for health on ADLAY will provide
evidence. A more formidable obstacle to the comparison is
that generic outcome indicators have not been applied
systematically to health policy areas. Kind and Williams
(2004, 1) wrote: ‘It is remarkable that we know so little
about the health improvements brought about by the enor-
mous array of activities provided by the NHS, but in recent
years some piecemeal attempts have been made to rectify
the situation’. They recommend the systematic application
of EQ-5D to all areas of health services; a major step
towards comprehensive and systematic QALY analysis. One
of its five dimensions is Anxiety and Depression, possibly
close enough to be mapped onto a social care morale and
wellbeing dimension. 
1.2 Comparing funding options 
Selection of funding options. WR designed funding model
types, and undertook a general evaluation of model exem-
plars of eight of the types chosen to provide variety.15 The
types were ‘free personal care’, ‘social insurance’, ‘means-
tested public funding’, ‘the partnership model’, ‘limited
liability’ (a version of the American Connecticut Partnership
and its descendants, including the Conservative ‘partnership’
model: DHSS (1997), Care Savings Account, and private
insurance. 
Space does not permit a description of the first stage of the
evaluation at which model types were systematically scored
by the general criteria developed in the literature. The first
stage dismissed some runners which had been thought poten-
tial winners a decade ago, indeed later (Brodsky et al.,
2003; Gibson et al., 2003; OECD, 2005); and are still
promoted in some countries. Some of the types offering
more universal cover like German long term care (social)
insurance, and by implication treated by some as if impor-
tant elements (if not the entire model) could well be applied
in England, did not score highly when all the criteria were
taken into account. That the UK’s social care paradigm
uses a much wider and more subtle range of criteria for the
evaluation of policy success in long-term care than those
for which evidence is available for countries which have
adopted the social insurance route is relevant because policy-
makers tend to look for models elsewhere which work better
by their paradigm’s criteria (Rose, 1991). Perhaps also
some recent history of the schemes contributed to their
lower ratings: crude reliance on risk factors not welfare
shortfalls in the implicit definition of eligibility and allo-
cations; inefficiencies in the production of welfare outcomes;
inflexibilities in response to worsening balances of demands
and income flows in two of the best known long-term care
insurance systems; the replacement of the well established
Dutch arrangements by some more like those in Sweden and
England.16
WR concluded that two exemplars of the eight families best
met the general criteria. These were ‘free personal care’ of
which a variant had been implemented in Scotland, and ‘the
partnership model’, in which the state would finance ‘a basic,
minimum level of care’, and would match private payments
above that up to a maximum package cost ‘set in line with
available resources’ (WR 2006, p.231). The partnership
model satisfied the WR effectiveness-equity-efficiency
criteria somewhat better: ‘a more sophisticated and less
costly mechanism’ WR commented. They were compared
with a re-parameterised version of the existing means-testing
model. Although a means-testing model with substantially
different values set for all its parameters could yield greatly
improved performance compared with the present, its basic
features interferes with equalizing the incremental benefit/cost
ratios of what users would actually consume, a prerequisite
for optimal achievement of the goal implicit in the policy
goals. Some distortions would be basically similar to those
of the present system, re-parameterisation reducing but not
removing them. There is no escaping the fundamental truth.
Poor Law mechanisms were designed for another age.
Perhaps only argument based on the slow adaptation of
cultures behaviours and supply systems or a value shift more
thoroughly subordinating  social policy to the requirements
of an age of ferocious global competition could make them
acceptable; and in the former case, only temporarily. We
return to the theme below. 
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2. Discussion 
2.1. Issue framing and evidence analysis 
WR has shifted the discourse enough to make some comfort-
able intellectual habits more difficult to square with the
public interest. That is illustrated in three areas where by
the use of new (and more technically demanding) method-
ologies, WR has shifted the framework for discourse. 
Advancing knowledge about how resource inputs affect
valued outcomes. This is the most formidable challenge –
to understand how and in what way through time events and
circumstances affect the impact of resource: user and carer
circumstances, values and cultures underlying expectations,
behaviour and preferences; supply-side cultures, policies,
processes and practice, endowments, circumstances affect-
ing the pattern of productivities of service. So easy to write,
so difficult for the research world to achieve, it requires
the use of a wide enough range of social science in design-
ing collections and their analysis, recognition of the
connection between what they are finding and the broad
framework of policy discourse. For what proportion of the
time of what proportion of our working lives are we
researchers happily hacking our way through the wood
without understanding the importance of those twigs and
leaves for undersanding a world of great and subtle varia-
tions in what counts and what affects its individuals? 
Valuing outcomes. The history has been too short for there
to have been time to explore the forms of interrelatedness
of preferences and their dependence on circumstances and
characteristics: the equivalent in utility analysis of data
collection designs and the equation forms which allow
complicated joint supply, non-linearities and non-monoto-
nicities, substitution and complementarity effects (many
already themes of utility theory) to show themselves – the
interdependence of utilities of persons within a network, the
dependence of the marginal valuation for one outcome on
the level of another achieved, circumstances in which mech-
anisms which distort perceptions and expressions of
preference work in what way. Already there is evidence that
preferences are associated with users’, carers’ and other citi-
zens’ circumstances; and in particular, and predictably,
whether they have actually experienced of services.17 There
are other issues which are tricky in other ways also.18 19
Whose valuations should be sought? The Pareto principle
on which much normative economics is based might suggest
the most relevant preferences would be the user and carer
populations and those most at risk, though sensitivity of
valuations to the degree of unmet seem often to be reduced
by psychological adaptation to their position. However the
general citizen would be expected to foot the subsidy bill.
Should their preferences should be altogether discounted if
they do not agree to it? The issue has long been recognized.
Alan Williams wrote in 1974 that at ‘the heart of the matter
... is a societal judgment as to who shall play what role
according to what rules’ (p.71), clearly still one factor
underlying differences in arguments about policy and
funding models today. 
Projecting costs, outcome values and their incidence.
Like all reports since the Royal Commission on Long-Term
Care, WR uses more elaborate simulation modelling
methodologies to project consequences over its time horizon
to 2026. Indeed, continuity in the discourse has been helped
by them all using the same model and its descendants and
elaborations. Again, the challenge is the same: to cross
subject and topic boundaries, to recognise the development
of the knowledge base for projecting the consequences of
alternative funding mechanism as something to which an
apparently unrelated analysis of data base can contribute.
Because some societies have potential for suggesting trends
in structures and cultures in others and anticipation of
scenario evolution is the key, add the information for the
imaginative basis for the models from other societies. Again,
there are the same obstacles: those who have investigated
the right areas have not thought it useful to ask the ques-
tions the answers to which would best develop the WR-type
framework. Perhaps it will help that more states will come
to develop WR-type argument. When they do so, we can
expect a greater variety in assumptions and so in the archi-
tecture of projection models: a great stimulus to intellectual
progress. 
The mushroom growth of climate change theory illustrates
why. Projection of demand and supply of long-term care
has some characteristics in common with the projection of
climate change and its consequences – a relatively new area
with a rapid increase in understanding, great sensitivity in
estimates to assumptions about trends20, the potential for
differences in the fundamental architecture of the causal
models implicit in the projections models, deep uncertainty
and so the need to attempt to attach probabilities to scenar-
ios, differences in perspectives and interest in what should
be a transparent and pluralist discourse about alternative
policies and so a preference for different position on the
probability distributions of greatest interest to the partici-
pant. 
The Stern Report suggests how the subject might develop.
Projections are summarised in Figure 3. As in long-term
care projections – for instance the plotting of the funnel of
doubt in Wittenberg et al. (1998) and Hancock, Wittenberg
et al. (2006, Figure 26) - the differences between low and
high base case projections for each type of model are much
greater than the differences in projections between models.
(The large number of independent models is not of rele-
vance for long-term care: it would be fanciful to imagine
more than one or a few for each country.) Such figures help
to focus discussion. Finance ministries would no doubt have
a concern for the costs to public funds and press for a solu-
tion with a probability of 90 per cent that it would not
exceed a certain proportion of the GDP, while consumer
interest groups would be interested inter alia in the thresh-
old benefit: cost ratio, and would press for parameterisation
of a model yielding not less than a 90 per cent probability
that those whose interests they promote would actually
receive benefits of at least a particular threshold level. 
16
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To conclude: great though the contributions of the WR
analysis are, it and others on which it draws rely too much
on early cost/time-limited evidence analysed. There are
implications 
• Social science sometimes needs ‘bigger’ (if certainly
anything but ‘big’) research by natural science
standards. Bigger research is risky and with long
collection periods and vast collection effort, of
apparently low productivity. Too often, it has paid
better to keep clear of it save as hitch-hiker. But it
can produce uniquely important evidence. 
• There should be more research collaborations across
disciplines and groups as long as much of the work is
integrated rather than in parallel. Disciplinary
associations can provide the frameworks for working
groups seeking to establish such work. The flexibility
demanded in such working should be better reflected
in education and training of researchers and the
courses and professional settings from which they are
recruited. Many would agree that the principles are
mainly honoured in the breach, suggesting that the
challenges to actual performance are not trivial. 
• Research funders can helpfully remember that one
quality that makes applied research reliable enough to
use is its theoretical strength, barely visible though
that may be to the research user. 
• The pressure group, manager or politician can
helpfully remind themselves that the useful generalities
are only likely to have the validity their plausibility
suggests when based on hard detailed work often
requiring technical skill and repeated and costly
collection and analysis of evidence. Academe must
assert the importance of time horizons and the time
and resources to think around issues and others must
not be so foolish as to denigrate it for doing so.
2.2. WR policy alternatives 
WR logic depended on analysis of the properties of types
at least as much as on the more detailed quantitative analy-
sis of exemplars. Would each possible member of a type
share the properties of evaluative significance to a greater
degree with other members of the type than with almost any
member of other types? Could it be that the properties for
types running in tandem – or hybrids – could be greatly
different? Would the partnership type be the best of those
so far considered whatever economic weather the changing
climate throws at us? Since the immediate future will be a
difficult to time to commit to a radical change – a low
maximum achievable allocation for public expenditure at
least in the near future; as always, a slower rate of change
in the capacity to cope of the kind of vulnerable people who
would be losers by the changes than optimists trying to
pursue new visions in the policy world assume; and like-
wise a slower and more geographically unequal pace of
adaptability of service commissioning and supply systems
– can we expect a better time later? If so, should we now
choose a second best solution, but one which will ease the
adoption of the partnership model later? 
Within- and between-type variations in model proper-
ties. No doubt, the Treasury-led committee to develop
alternatives are examining more variants within families,
though there is not yet a comparison and synthesis of the
pattern of outcomes from even from the published work.
There are questions galore to ask of the quantitative analy-
sis of the patterns. What WR-found patterns can be most
relied upon? There might be more sensitivity at the second
than at the first stage in the WR analyses, even of costs
and outcomes and their incidence. But it is difficult to
imagine that some key differences between the serious
contenders would be removed if the comparison was with
some new variant of a rival; other than a variant which is
so exotic as to resemble nothing seen in real life if only
because some of its special features would conflict too much
with the national values for that type to be chosen.22
Definitely the partnership model come what may? The
partnership model could work well for balance of ideas
about ends and means within the range of mainstream British
discourse, given time to adjust and some minimum of public
spending. A high enough level for the unmatched element
of the state contribution would virtually avoid losers. So
what the minimum would be would depend on the design
of the implementation plan, about which no clues are avail-
able. What factors would affect the minimum? Could the
policy system deliver that minimum? 
The capacity to cope of vulnerable people likely to lose
by model change is a factor suggesting that there exists a
minimum. Changes in expectations and capacities of succes-
sive cohorts to manage change are easy to over-estimate.
Circumstances making it more difficult to cope are well
established: many least affected by transformed life chances
and roles as proactive consumers; many with a lifetime
trapped by the absence of opportunities and skills, and have
family members who are similarly constrained; most at
high risk too old to be baby-boomers;23 many hit by health
accidents which at least for a considerable period greatly
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 6 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
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Figure 3: Probability distributions of an outcome given
probability-weighted scenario variations in each of a
variety of projection models; source: Meinshausen (2006)
in Stern (2007)21
limits their capacities to self-manage, often causing a gestalt
switch in assumption and morale to an expectation of decline
and death; many with debilitating clinical and sub-clinical
depression and cognitive impairment (Pavlou and Lachs,
2006). DH initiatives and CSCI policies developing more
detailed policy attempting to combine choice and empow-
erment with avoiding excessive danger and risk reflect
dilemmas more clearly than the policy papers stating policy
argument and proposals at their most general level (CSCI,
2006a, 2006b; DH, 200624).25
A slow and geographically uneven rate of adaptation
and effectiveness/efficiency improvement of local
commissioning and care systems would be a second factor
suggesting a minimum. The performance of the social care
system in England and Wales was in important respects
transformed during the decade between the late eighties
and nineties. Can the system respond as greatly to the
requirements of the policies in the green and white papers?
During the nineties there was in one respect a happy coin-
cidence of wants. Prioritising user independence in the
sense of enabling more users to be supported longer in
their own homes was something which managers at all
levels and field professionals could and did accept as the
highest priority (Davies and Challis, 2000) because it fitted
long-term aspirations and values of the social care paradigm,
and was mainly (not wholly) strengthened by incentives
from the financing arrangements after 1993.26
National priorities then changed. Coordination with health
services at various levels in Leutz’s (1999) typology became
the top priority. Rewards and sharp sanctions for adult
social care were made more dependent on performance
indicators of the social care contribution to achieving health
system priorities. Health care received large funding
increases while social care authorities continued to suffer
severe fiscal stress, though it was widely believed that
social care (home and community services as well as care
homes) was substantially reducing the demand for acute
beds.27 Unsurprisingly, the gap between some national
policy goals and the reality has seemed increasingly widen
as a result (McNally et al., 2003).28 For instance, the
proportion of areas in which only the two highest Fair
Access to Care Services (FACS) (DH, 2001) priority clas-
sification of cases actually received services was increasing
well before the most recent cuts (CSCI, 2006; Jones, 2006). 
The green paper (DH, 2005) reasserted and reworked retain-
able values and policy principles of the social care paradigm
while redefining it as part of a broader health and well being
paradigm. But it redefined the issues in a way which made
tackling them more complex at the same time as proclaim-
ing a context of changing expectations and – most directly
tackled by WR – a worsening resource balance. Re-engi-
neering and substitution were major themes, but its argument
was that to cope with the changed balance of demands and
public budgets, many of the substitutions would replace
resources financed from the adult social care budgets of
‘councils with responsibilities for social services’ [CSSRs]
by others; for instance by substituting universal services not
financed from the social care budget for mainstream social
care services, leveraging effort from the Voluntary and
Community Sector, and other sources of care in the commu-
nity. Directors of Adult Services were to play a leading role
in promoting ‘local wellbeing agenda’: a task whose precise
aims and form would vary greatly from place to place and
from time to time, including the quantitative precision of
links between means and ends. There were exhortations to
develop new forms of governance to match the need to
negotiate ends and means in the context of multiple inter-
ests and uncertainty. That is the Green Paper stressed the
development of interventions whose contexts would
necessarily make their creation and management generate
more ‘wicked’ issues than the mainstream services (Rittel
and Webber, 1973) more than, for instance, the white paper
of 1998, and to recommend governance arrangements
accordingly.29 The complexity and uncertainty of the
contexts and processes in which they would be established
and the novel elements in their inputs, logics, cultures and
prioritisation of effects, would create a low degree of tech-
nological determinacy at least until relationships and
understandings had been fully established and trust in their
continuation created. Experience has shown that when these
preconditions for achieving a practically useful degree of
technological determinacy are established at all, it usually
takes much longer than optimistic managers expect and
implicitly promise. 
Paradoxically, the Green Paper argued that the system
should also continue to cultivate the virtuous consequences
of using tools of which some assume a practically useful
degree of technological determinacy (Davies et al., 2000),
including what white papers called consistency (mentioned
in 1989 and a main theme in 1998). The reforms of the
period during which technological determinacy was most
emphasised certainly delivered the then prioritised goals
much more effectively by the later nineties. The propor-
tions of losses of some prioritised dimensions of welfare
predicted from risk factors were by then being offset by up
to a remarkable 25 per cent on average among users and
principal carers, and there were effects for a wide range of
the dimensions of evaluative importance in the social care
paradigm. 
The greater consistency in the relations between means and
ends by the late nineties sharpens the dilemmas of simul-
taneously pressing the exploitation of the benefits of
technological determinacy and increased reliance on new
‘wicked’ ways of producing welfare for which the uncer-
tainty of outcomes is great. The opportunity costs of relying
more on wicked ways have been increased by the greater
clarity and consensus about the prioritisation of goals, high
risk offset proportions, clearer patterns of service substi-
tution and complementarity, and the dependence of these
on user and carer circumstances. Greater losses of other
valued benefits than before would be caused by changing
the prioritisation of goals, particularly by giving the highest
priority to outcomes for which the relations between means
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and the end are unclear to the key field and lower manage-
ment actors.30 A more determinate technology and greater
consistency in its application imply less reducible ineffi-
ciency, and so larger opportunity costs if priorities are
changed or efficiency savings are imposed. That would be
still more powerfully the case if demand were diverted
from health to social care as the NHS is put under increas-
ing pressure during the coming CSR period, if more social
care resources were absorbed by NHS-led schemes with
different targeting priorities and objectives, and if the
resource balance in social care worsened. 
The dangers are obvious. Putting great effort and resources
into developing those new ways of tapping resources to
produce welfare which create the uncertainties and complex-
ities of policy areas which are wicked may distract councils
from achieving highly valued outcomes which have been
increasingly effectively delivered with policies based largely
on assuming a practically useful degree of technological
determinacy. It may be more difficult for CSCI’s succes-
sor to monitor commissioners and providers to the best
effect. Perhaps it would be safer to err towards minimis-
ing the reliance on wicked ways of producing welfare than
vice versa. 
Fortunately, most of the most important new ways need not
be wicked indefinitely, though conversion will require time,
effort and resources. The analyses which were the basis of
the concept of the ‘wicked problem’ distinguished between
contexts in which the wicked characteristics could be tempo-
rary from those in which wickedness was irredeemably
permanent (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Wood, 1944).31 But
conversion from wickedness will require the skilful, gradual,
committed, continuing and well-focused management of
change, supported by sufficient, well-grounded and contin-
uing investment in human, organisational and physical capital
and investment to create stability and trust, preconditions for
cooperation and collaboration between people and organisa-
tions.32 Perhaps then in the longer run the forms of
intervention which are by nature irredeemably wicked will
consume too low a proportion of the resources for their oppor-
tunity costs massively to reduce welfare. It is in that longer
run that the demands for public financing will be greatest. 
Could it be that making this optimistic scenario a reality
could be helped by processes parallel to those observed in
the urban regeneration programme (Whitehead, 2007)? The
WR findings are key for putting the issues into perspec-
tive. The Green Paper developed the substitution and
innovation argument substantially because without such
substitutions and innovation, likely public funding would be
insufficient to meet the demands with the then policies. A
systematic shift in resources substantially reducing the vast
underfunding shown by the WR in time to contribute when
the innovations are at their most technologically indeter-
minate could transform the degree to which ambitions could
be achieved in the long run. 
What then is the lowest WR threshold which would keep
down the collateral damage of the most vulnerable losers
to an acceptable degree? WR estimates suggest under-
spending on social care compared with the NHS by
approximately one fifth if the threshold is set in terms of
core personal care business alone, two fifths including well-
being. And budgeting makes no allowance for transitional
costs. Only modelling of costs and the value of outcomes
with allowance for transitional costs given realistic assump-
tions about the kinds of difficulty discussed above could give
a quantitative feel for the answer. Presumably this is a
focus of the activity of the Treasury-led team. 
How likely is it that the government will deliver the
minimum in the medium term? The room for manoeuvre
in the triennium of the CSR08 (Comprehensive Spending
Review) is presumably strictly limited, whatever the
marginal rates of return on different forms of spending.
What effort should government make in the longer run? The
focus should be on the health vote and on the transfer of
Attendance and Disability Living allowances from the social
security budget. 
The latter is easier to discuss partly for the bad reason that
we have less knowledge on which to base estimates of the
opportunity costs in terms of lost welfare of reducing these
benefits. Would it be fair to apply to those British benefits
the same scepticism about their impacts on our prioritised
subtle but well-defined British social care outcomes as we
apply to the German benefit in cash because government
until recently has not demanded to know? The evidence is
old and slight. Davies, Fernandez and Saunders (1998) did
not find that Attendance Allowance receipt reduced the
probability of admission to institutions for long-term care
during the eighties. They estimated that the French ACTP
was more successful. WR reasonably bases its suggestions
on what is known. In several OECD countries disability and
related policy areas are in question. And some of these are
not traditionally tied in level and eligibility to the other
elements in the wider social security system. It is difficult
to deny the WR argument that substantial redistribution to
the social care budget would add to the sum of human
welfare, as indeed was suggested thirty years ago (Davies
and Challis, 1986). But there should surely be transitional
compensation for the losers, and the many who will be
unable to adjust without great loss of welfare because of
the nature of their disabilities – many more than the most
obvious examples like socially isolated victims of autism
with personality difficulties and substantial learning diffi-
culties, for instance. Those transitional arrangements should
continue over an indefinite period in the absence of a more
efficient and welfare-improving alternative. 
WR creates an extremely strong case about the direction,
and order of magnitude for the redistribution from health
votes that would maximise welfare. Highly respected
experts suspect there to be little evidence that there is
anything like the same marginal rate of return being
achieved in many areas of the NHS. However, NICE
recommendations have so far affected only a very small
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percentage of the total NHS spend. Appleby (2007,
p.50) argues that such evaluation should be carried out
‘at another level’ than NICE precisely in order to
contribute to setting limits on NHS budgets, a theme
parallel with that of the paper by Kind and Williams
(2004). Appleby suggests that ‘from the limited data that
does exist, it is hard to demonstrate that the NHS is on
the steepest part of the curve where the health returns
from additional spending are high. In no area among
those reviewed are there major identifiable health gains
that can be attributed to extra health spending alone.
This is even true of the diseases such as cancer and
coronary heart disease (CHD) on which the government
has focused extra resources . . . Gains are being achieved
in such areas as convenience and process benefits (for
example, the changes that have led to shorter waiting
times within hospital accident and emergency depart-
ments). Some of these may lead to better health
outcomes, but the main argument used by the govern-
ment for setting targets such as these derives from the
perception that ‘expectations’ of service performance are
rising and that people want choice of when and where
to be treated and easier access to whatever services they
choose . . . While this is intuitively convincing, in fact
there is very little hard evidence about the value placed
on benefits of these kinds, nor indeed of the costs of
providing these benefits’ (Appleby, 2007, p.53). That is,
the gains are more comparable with the wellbeing and
morale gains from social care quality of life, but unlike
the gains from additional social care, at the margin they
are probably are likely to be at much higher cost than
the NICE threshold. 
So in a rational and just world, the minimum would be
provided, even if not immediately. But it is one thing to
speak truth to power, another for power so much as to
acknowledge it, and yet another for government to act to
remedy the inequity and inefficiency. The low expected
increase in the adult social care budget for the CSR08 trien-
nium has been repeatedly proclaimed. With a low CSR
settlement not just for this but for subsequent triennia, the
partnership model would have to be designed to incorpo-
rate an extremely high incremental benefit/cost ratio, a very
low proportions of that set as the limit for the state enti-
tlement, and/or a low state match to consumer payments.
Given the threshold, the lower the state entitlement, and the
lower the State match, the bigger the gap left to be covered
by co-payments. 
As a contingency plan, should we envisage garnering
whatever additional budget is available for less costly
attempts to soften the edges of the means-tested system
during the medium term? There is a historical precedent.
After all, except for shifting skilled nursing care to the NHS,
making incremental changes to the system was how the
government acted in response to the Royal Commission
report of 1999 (DH, 2000). The literature has already
explored various combinations of changing upper and lower
limits of capital disregards and of income for either or both
residential or home care, reducing the tariff rate, or abol-
ishing the assets element (JRF, 2006; Hirsch, 2005;
Hancock, Wittenberg et al., 2006; Royal Commission,
1999, pp.58–62). 
How long would the medium run last? Certainly longer than
one or two CSR triennia. Space does not allow an analy-
sis of factors influencing its duration. Since the key
constraint is surely what level of public spending will be
forthcoming, the key precondition for a successful bid will
be what growth in per capita GDP will follow from our
performance in the global economy. For what it is worth,
not until between 2035 and 2040 are the total and old age
dependency ratios projected to stabilise.33 Hancock,
Wittenberg et al. (2006, Table 6) projections until 2051 of
the demands and supply of long-term care of older people
(with current policies) suggest diminishing rates of growth
of public spending decade on decade after 2012, with a
decline in the percentage increase by 20 per cent during the
decade beginning in 2041. The pattern may not be very
different for several model types. Radical change would still
be an expensive undertaking, slightly less to the degree
that the means-testing model were upgraded in the interim.
Perhaps the conclusion is that there will not be an ideal
period for a change to a model shifting responsibilities to
the state unless the long run is defined so as to satisfy
Keynes’ observation that it is the period in which we are
all dead.34
The focus of WR was selecting main funding mechanisms.
Whatever is chosen will create opportunities for ‘niche’
models to make a contribution when policy is sufficiently
in place to create a more stable policy environment. It will
then be important for the State to identify and publicise
market failures, by that means helping to spot niches for
which supplementary models would be useful. Government
should publish its appraisal of proposals like that reported
in WR by Kent County Council to continue work on the
BRITSMO model (Davies and Challis, 1986) for which
support in experimental implementation was first recom-
mended in the Griffiths Report in 1987 (Griffiths, 1987;
Wanless et al., 2006, pp. 246–250).
3. Conclusions 
WR has provided England with a clear direction for policy
development based on evidence about what could most equi-
tably and efficiently produce the benefits sought by means
of long-term care policy. In the new real economy of care
produced in the nineties, attempts to cope with additional
demand and to increase quality will require higher spend-
ing because much of the system’s inefficiency has been
squeezed out by years of lower rates of increase in social
care spending in relation to demands and relative price
effects. Without the higher spending, even arguably effi-
ciency-improving innovations would be financed largely by
robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
WR results confirm large under-funding of this Cinderella
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of the DH family. The WR estimates carry all the more
conviction because they applied conservative assumptions:
the low ceiling spend per ADLAY compared with actual
NICE practice as described by its chair, the calculation of
under-funding by approximately one fifth for a narrow ‘core
business’ concept of outcomes, much larger assuming a
concept including wellbeing effects. This underfunding has
been long and often argued from other evidence. The under-
funding worsened during most of the reform period. It
distorted the implementation of key policies, particularly in
care management and service commissioning and develop-
ment, seriously weakening the outcome-affecting processes
on whose outcome effects the logic of the reforms was
argued. The continuation of gross underfunding would
similarly distort and weaken the outcome-producing process
and practice of the new models promoted in current
policy – particularly for the outcomes prioritised through-
out the period, because the earlier models were designed
exclusively for their production, the new models being little
different in their values and arrangements for producing
those outcomes but adding new and often conflicting
objectives. 
Several things would help the policy process to correct the
under-funding. 
One is to continue and involve more people and groups in
policy debate making use of the Wanless framework and
the type of evidence it uses. It requires that more of the
interested parties should tool themselves to participate in
its deepening and development. That would help to create
a coincidence between spending allocations which would
best improve human welfare and those which would most
gain electoral support. It would substantially reduce the
undue influence of established but partially erroneous
assumptions, unbalanced formulations of issues and argu-
ments, and so in effect the interests of some actors and
groups. 
A second is to ensure the continuing influence of the social
care paradigm with field reorganisations and the amalga-
mation of the agencies for quality assurance and
improvement for health and social care. The national quality
improvement body has a degree of constitutional inde-
pendence of the day to day pressures on the politicians and
the executive. The danger most discussed in the international
literature is ‘capture’: excessively frequent surrender to
external interests in the effort to contribute to consensus.35
Reorganisation at the field level has tended to place those
most influenced by the social care paradigm into the organ-
isational authority structures of paradigms dominated by
other ends and means. When circumstances are difficult,
outright confrontation with the strong may not seem to
them to be the most effective way to make what limited
progress may be possible. 
A third is to ensure that the policy of devolution to lower
level governments and independent agencies, and extend-
ing citizen empowerment in return for risk and
responsibility, is accompanied by increasingly extensive
and rigorous evaluation. WR illustrates how powerful can
be the evidence produced from it. But again there is a
danger of capture when such a high proportion of the money
for big and continuing research collections and analysis on
long-term care is provided by such few sources. If so, can
we envisage creating institutional arrangements which would
reduce it? The question has been put many times before and
will no doubt be put many times in the future. 
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Notes
1 It reflects the development of the interpretation of one use of the
concept ‘need’ as equitable and efficient allocation. Feldstein
(1963) wrote that the many advocated ‘meeting needs’ when ‘it
would make for clearer analysis if they talked about “optimising
the use of resources”’. During the seventies, York economists
led and others followed in developing the cost-benefit concept of
need (Culyer, Lavers, and Williams, 1971), a step in the
development of what Culyer (2006) identifies as a theme in the
development of ‘extra-welfarist’ theory better fitted to inform
policy-makers than the more reductionist approaches in
theoretical welfare economics (Culyer, 2006). A stream of
papers followed using the cost-benefit concept to analyse policy
argument, the rationale of methodologies for developing social
indicators, and structures and processes by which resources were
allocated using concepts like the policy paradigm. For instance,
Williams (1974, p.65) used it to dismiss its then common use as
what he called ‘need as quasi-supply concept’ where ‘need’ was
defined as existing over the whole range of marginal
productivities between the current level of welfare and the point
at which they ceased add to the value of outputs because, first,
that led to an overstatement of under-funding – and, secondly,
not there argued, for different outcomes, the ratio of areas under
the productivity curves in the range between the actual level and
the optimal need threshold on the one hand to the area in the
range from the optimal threshold to the top of the curve on the
other, is likely to differ greatly between commodities, thus
biasing estimation if the quasi-supply concept were the basis of
indicators in models; Davies (1974) applied the cost-benefit need
concept in conditions 
of technical determinacy to the design of indicators in the context
of the theory of standards-setting and to the measurement of
need as welfare shortfall defined in relation to the cost-benefit
need threshold, the range which Netten et al. (2005) define as
measuring a concept aking to Sen’s capability; Davies (1975a;
1977a) applied it to the discussion of needs indicators implicit in
policy paradigms as one element in the theory of variations in
local policy outputs; Davies (1976a, b) to the rationale for a new
design for need-compensating central government grants to local
authorities; Davies (1977b) to the discussion of its relevance to
the empirical measurement and valuation of outcomes and
production function studies using techniques applied in transport
studies and studies using a human capital theory framework; and
Davies (1985) the different weighting of dimensions for
aggregating data into an indicator of supply-side non-resource
inputs (weightings to leave outputs unchanged) and into an
indicator of outcomes (valuation weights for the range between
the observed and threshold cost-benefit need level). 
2 The analysis depends on a classification of ‘services’ assumed to
have the same balance of content across local systems save to the
degree that differences are controlled for by other variables in
the estimation models. For practical purposes of interpretation
and application, the assumption is that differences in content
between systems in each ‘service’ are small compared with
differences between services. Of course, as such studies have
long emphasised and as national policy has increasingly pressed,
it is important to engineer services around local system contexts.
Models for areas whose services have different contents would of
course have different classifications of services, and yield at least
slightly different patterns of substitution, complementarity,
economies of scale, etc.; that is models must be interpreted in
the context of their purpose and geographical scope. 
3 Situations with linear relationships were often characterised by a
scarcity of the service in question: less of the service with
constrained supply was consumed than would have been desired
or would have been efficient. 
4 See Davies, Fernandez, and Nomer (2000) for such equation
forms. To estimate the substitution and complementarity effects,
it is necessary for the outcome indicators to be general to all
inputs. If the raw information ties the outcome to each individual
indicator separately – frequently done in all countries, the sum
of the effects will exceed the true overall effect. Also the
outcome variables for each domain must include questions
worded to make it clear to users, carers and other respondents
that what is being asked about are the overall effects of services,
as well as questions about achieving service goals and process
quality narrowly defined. 
5 Particularly 
– The ‘productivities’ of services are highly contingent on risk
factors and other circumstances. We discuss the effects of low
morale and its correlates below. Low morale is associated with
greater disability, so that failure to allow adequately for it can
yield what are oxymoronic negative estimates of marginal
productivities or costs in conditions of tight service rationing. 
– Most services affect several outcome dimensions but to
different degrees, with the impacts depending on the mix of
inputs and outcomes and supply side factors. Therefore it is
key for efficiency and effectiveness to mix services in a way
which best exploits the relationship between service
productivities and service prices (or marginal costs) given the
other factors. 
– Levels of one outcome affect the ‘marginal productivities’ of
services in the production of other outcomes. For instance,
morale and depression at sub-clinical as well as clinical levels
affect the costs of improving other care outcomes by
whomsoever rated. In part, this is because users and carers
themselves necessarily ‘co-produce’ some outcomes and can
contribute to the co-production of others, and do so less if
paralysed by low morale or clinical depression. Also some
outcomes are user or carer perceptions, and the effects of low
morale should be included. 
6 The WR production function for it, estimated from ECCEP data,
predicted the service inputs required to bring the perceived
burden of caring of principal informal caregivers down to a
threshold level established by mapping onto the ECCEP’s main
indicator of carer burden a threshold from another ECCEP
indicator for which an appropriate threshold had been established
in the American literature. The ECCEP project included triadic
design elements for the collection of data for users, principal
informal caregivers and care managers, thus permitting analysis
of the interdependence of utility functions and of differences in
perception of situations and outcomes. 
7 OPUS was the product of government-sponsored research. It
worked to, and was helped by a reference group who usefully
reflected the dilemmas of policy and practice affecting resource
allocation at the time. Central government officials and local
managers were powerfully represented on the reference group.
Their experience and views were powerfully reflected in the
domain structure and the wording of instruments. 
8 Morale change (and associated indicators) were used as an
outcome in some streams of the British literature since Mattilda
Goldberg’s path-breaking experiment (1970), and indicators for
much the same domain were used in major American
experiments like channelling (Wooldridge et al 1986). 
9 Examples are the influence of reduced carer stress on reducing
the marginal cost of extending user stays at home and improving
user satisfaction with services, and substantial levels of ROPPs
(Risk Offset Proportion from Productivity effects, measuring the
proportion of the predicted effects of risk factors offset by
service inputs; Davies et al., 2000, p.170) for indicators of
reduced felt burden of caregiving and improved locus of control
among users of 25 per cent and affecting 90 per cent of carers,
improved satisfaction with life development (18 per cent
affecting 40 per cent of users), and the general Philadelphia
Geriatric Center morale scale (Lawton, 1975), 12 per cent and
72 per cent (Davies, Fernandez, and Nomer, 2000, Figures 11.2
and 12.1). Social care inputs clearly increased morale and related
variables for substantial proportions of users – just as they
improved users’ feelings of empowerment over their own life,
‘locus of control’ (24 and 54 per cent). 
10 It will be remembered that the rate of diversion of more disabled
users to social from health care accelerated from the end of the
decade. National government set performance targets in ways
which focused social care more on a narrower (and different)
clientele in seeking to prioritise the reduction of demands on
acute beds and aspects of need traditionally the foci of health
care: not the imposition of the ‘medical model’, but an important
refocusing away from some core elements of the social care
paradigm and its outcome and targeting priorities nonetheless.
Fiscal pressure continues. One reason is that the new health-
orientated priorities for the social care services, including
servicing new branches of NHS-led community activities for
health policy purposes, have to be financed from social service
budgets which are only modestly growing. Local authorities have
been complaining about the difference in growth rates between
social care and NHS expenditures. ‘Support for services such as
social care through the general grant has increased by just 14 per
cent in real terms since 1997/98. This is in stark contrast to the
NHS, which has seen a 90 per cent rise over the same period.
Half of local authorities with social care responsibilities received
a government grant increase below inflation this year’ (LGA,
2006). The LGA survey of February 2007 again raised the
consequences of NHS resource pressures for cost-shunting to
social care, though suggesting that a lower proportion of
authorities were intending (or contemplating) a step change
between FACS levels in the minimum eligibility criterion,
though substantial proportions suggesting other effects which
would reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of service,
including diminished preventive effects (LGA, 2007). 
11 In response to the LGA finance survey in March 2006, 77 per
cent of the respondents suggested that they would raise the
eligibility floor during the coming year. Carson (2006) reported
that one third of the councils responding to a Counsel and Care
survey had tightened eligibility criteria in the past year and two-
thirds now only offer care to older people with ‘critical’ and
‘substantial’ risk levels. It was reported that Hampshire planned
to raise the threshold to the topmost (‘critical’ risk) level of the
fourfold FACS classification. 
12 Central government promoted a new priority to wellbeing as an
outcome in Modernising Local Government (1998), which
proposed a duty ‘to promote economic social and environmental
wellbeing (para. 8.8) to be supported by a ‘discretionary power
to enable councils to take steps which will promote the wellbeing
of their area and those who live in it . . . provided that’ their
policies would not prejudice the performance of other functions
and those of other statutory agencies (para. 8.11). The logic was
reflected in the Better Government for Older People initiative,
and later in the 2005 green paper. 
13 For Interferon, it was estimated to be ‘up to £900,000’ per
QALY. 
14 The issue arises irrespective of how the eligibility for NHS
continuing care funding is defined, because there can be
conditions in which the victim consumes no health resources. 
15 Variety was sought with respect to eight characteristics, two in
particular: the degree of risk pooling (and so risk reduction and
cost), and the balance of State and individual responsibility.
Other characteristics were the balance between entitlement and
budget dominance; degree of redistribution; indemnity benefit
versus needs-meeting; national or local determination of benefit
levels and eligibility criteria; citizen choice of contribution and
benefit levels; reliance on informal care. 
16 One feature which at first sight seemed attractive was the
national standardisation, simplicity, transparency, and so greater
comprehensibility to citizens and beneficiaries/users of eligibility
criteria and their relationship to levels of benefit in cash or kind.
However, the subsequent development of some of the models
seems to be weakening precisely these elements to some degree
in the pursuit of new effectiveness and efficiency goals. For
instance, Dutch legislation in 1986 signals the abandonment of
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the AWBZ insurance mechanism, creating municipally subsidised
and managed models. Reacting to dissatisfaction with the way
the new system was working, and in particular to inadequate
case management and the supply side unresponsiveness to users’
wishes to which some partly attributed the fact that a high
proportion of users chose cash not services, the Germans
launched a major multi-site demonstration of a model in which
the entitlement is viewed as a ‘person-bound’ (individual) budget
with a professional case manager to help beneficiaries make their
choices of provision, and also coordinate with medical care,
increasing the likelihood of producing more welfare with the
resources by taking into account a wider and more subtle range
of circumstances and preferences, so lessening the clumsiness of
the social insurance arrangement by which benefits based on
crude individual and straightforward criteria are used in a user-
unresponsive system of provision. Whereas, early French
discourse had been substantially in the language of insurance -
‘fourth social risk’ and other metaphors, building on a standard
national evaluation instrument, with almost complete reliance
(for needs assessment) on the standard national tool, the AGGIR,
in the second and third stages of development from the use of
the disability benefit, the Allocation Compensatrice pour Tièrce
Personne, to a benefit for older people culminating with the
introduction of the Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie
likewise introduced assessment and care management by multi-
disciplinary teams (Davies, Fernandez, and Saunders’ 1988; le
Bihan and Martin, 2006). What was interesting about German
long-term care insurance was that it introduced benefits in kind
into an insurance framework with its assumptions that benefits
would be in cash. (Appropriate for their argument, some Anglo-
Saxon observers instead treated payment of the benefit in cash as
being what was interesting.) France too shifted some way from
the focus on cash benefits. The influential sociologist Claudine
Attias-Donfut had criticized the system thus: ‘il y une conception
très individualiste de la protection sociale. On aide des individus
isolés, indépendamment de leurs contextes’. Indeed, a French
historian of the process (writing for French readers) summed up
the French development as a shift from benefits in cash to
services in kind matching resources to needs; ‘The abandonment
of prêt-à-porter for tailored benefits’ (Frinault, 2005). Secondly,
as experience has accumulated, it became evident that
transparency carried with it the disadvantages accompanying
simplicity and inflexibility of contributions and benefit structures
and inflexibility of the regulatory structure. That made it more
difficult to maintain effectiveness efficiency and equity by other
criteria as the balance of pressures of demands and resources
worsened. The political difficulties in raising more contributions
(particularly from employers) in Germany caused benefits to lag
increasingly behind costs, causing increasing recourse to the
means-tested social assistance again, the escape from which for
users and for the sub-national funding bodies alike was a major
impetus for the introduction of long term care insurance. In
Japan, a similar situation was responded to by changes in
eligibility rules removing a substantial proportion of those who
would previously have been eligible, and by the introduction of
user co-payments for hotel costs in care homes (Ikegami, 2007).
A priori, it seems more difficult to achieve effectiveness, equity
and efficiency by the key outcome criteria of the social care
paradigm, as reflected for instance in the new WR criterion,
with a social insurance philosophy aimed to provide a
contingency benefit to cover crude risk factors than with some of
the alternative models.
17 For instance, already Ryan et al. (2006) have shown that there
are associations with routine variables like age, living
circumstances, and reporting both some impairment and currently
receiving services. People aged 85 and over were more
concerned about food and nutrition and less concerned about
social contact than younger recipients. Disabled people in receipt
of services ranked food and nutrition highest, followed by social
participation. (See Table 5.7) As they stand, these patterns are
Rorschag tests. The literature on valuation illustrates many
interpretations with quite different practical implications for the
analysis. Progress depends on teasing them out. 
18 More work is needed to investigate the most appropriate ways to
investigate differences in perceptions, to incorporate objective
risks and sense of safety and to identify utility weights with
nationally representative samples. Specific investigations into
groups of interest, such as ethnic minorities, would also both
potentially provide alternative utility indexes reflecting the
perspectives of these groups. 
19 That creates problems of interpretation. For some it is because
of the probability of cognitive dissonance among people
responding to great distress, adjustment of their reference group
to those with similar need-related circumstances, or other forms
of psychological adaptation to cope with their situation. For
others, it is that they are being asked to evaluate purely
hypothetical situations whose effects they cannot easily envisage.
Opinion differs whether valuation compression (by which those
with experience give responses which distinguish between levels
of unmet need less – in this study case, to a degree sufficient to
remove statistical significance in some analyses) makes the
valuations of the experienced more or less valid than the
weightings of others. Perhaps the judgment must depend on
whether it is the users’ own psychological interpretation which
should count the most. If so, there is a double danger that the
estimates may exaggerate the value of meeting unmet needs: first
the estimates are based on willingness to spend rather than
willingness to pay, and secondly, because the value weights are
more heavily weighted with the perceptions of the general
population than of service recipients. These influences from all
levels of illumination and irrationality down to the sub-conscious
influence individuals to differing degrees. Most perhaps are to
some degree potentially predictable from other data, so
eventually allowing the correction of the resulting biases in
estimates to a practically useful degree. They usefully warn the
reductive modeller against the hubris of imagining that all the
precise calculations provide are crude orders of magnitude and
monochrome sketches of complex polychrome patterns. 
20 One reason for the insistence of the designers of the projection
models from their earliest publications that it should be focused
primarily on examining the sensitivity of outcomes to scenario
variations, however inevitable the reliance of the policy world on
its best guess case projections. See Wittenberg et al. (1998). 
21 Reproduced under PCI license no.C2007000684. 
22 For instance, Hancock and Wittenberg (2006, tables 8 and 15)
illustrate how the incidence on public and private expenditure
can vary almost as greatly between current and the alternative
reforms of asset means tests investigated as between current
means tests and three variants of free personal care. But with the
free personal care options, the share of public spending is in all
versions lower, and the differences established early are
projected to be continued in the long run to 2051. Another
example: tipping the balance towards more formulaically
weighted allocation judgments based on general risk factor into
broad levels of care (as with social insurance) between now and
mid-century rather than towards allocation by a wide range of
factors, some complex and subjective, evaluated and weighted in
a context-sensitive judgment within broad guidelines (closer to
the Single Assessment Process philosophy) is likely to have more
certain effects on the distribution of welfare than projections for
2051 from alternative variants of our current funding model. 
23 Someone borne in 1946 will not reach eighty until the end of the
WR time horizon, almost twenty years hence. 
24 For instance, with respect to self-assessment and the allocation
of a provisional budget for self-administration, a key aspect of
one model of the commendable individual budgets model:
‘Enabling individuals to self-assess the threats to their own
independence/health is a complicated issue as there are potential
risks around inappropriate service delivery and failure to identify
some needs. . . . However, we believe that there are probably
areas where self-assessment could be used, for example in
assessments for some items of low-level, community equipment
and for other low-level services’ (DH 2006, p.38). 
25 Response to risk of diswelfares of various kinds is core to the
language and logic of the Fair Access policy for eligibility
determination and prioritisation: allocations to the four bands
being based on the ‘seriousness of the risk to independence or
other consequences if needs are not addressed’ (DH, 2003a,
2003b), and establishing this risk can require professional
interpretation of the situation: ‘needs assessment and risk
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evaluation rely for their quality on person-centred conversations
with individuals seeking help carried out by competent
professionals prepared to exercise their judgment . . .
Frameworks, case examples and the like can only ever support
the exercise of person-centred, competent judgment (DH,
2003b). Although some documents for models which require
self-management and risk tend to contain little discussion about
how hard it is to handle the dilemmas, scoring systems in self-
assessment forms give heavy weights to safety and risk domains
(Duffy and Waters, 2005; In Control, 2005), and some leading
the implementation of the models have argued the importance of
adapting policy and practice to recognise the dilemmas: ‘there is
a risk that a focus on enabling disabled people will lead to
services failing to identify those individuals where it is genuinely
too risky to hand over leadership to the person. There will need
to be a much greater onus on human services identifying people
at risk and authorising named individuals to take responsibility
for their services. At the moment the presumption of provider
control masks the possible options available, but there will be no
room for uncertainty in systems that seek to minimise central
control’ (Duffy, 2004). 
26 The remarkable correspondence of rankings by workers at all
levels in authorities and this top national priority was described
in Davies and Fernandez (2000). Restoring the bulk of the costs
of the public subsidisation of care home costs to the social care
budget created the conditions for the generalisation of what were
becoming the policies of leading authorities before the budgetary
responsibility was in effect transferred by the creation of the
Board and Lodging Allowance in 1980. So the development of
alternatives to residential care in the new policy logic of 1989
fitted the dominant values at all levels and in most groups in
social services departments. After a first year of relative plenty
in 1993, the growth of demand in excess of public budgets
sharpened the incentives both to find less costly home care
alternatives, and also to strike hard bargains with home care
providers – leading eventually to under-supply and pressure on
quality, as the theory of the nursing home market of the eighties
predicted (Davies, 1986, 1989; Davies and Knapp, 1988). 
27 The evaluation of a vaunted NHS nursing-led model, Evercare,
the model from which the community matron stream of NHS
schemes was to descend, had little if any effect on what it was
designed to produce, diversion of demand from acute beds
(Boaden et al., 2005; 2006). In contrast, estimates of the effects
of inter-personal variations in utilisation of home and community
services suggested that home care had large effects on the
utilisation of acute beds over a period of two years (Fernandez
and Davies, 2004). Perhaps the excess demand for acute beds
have been reduced more had the money been spent by the social
services departments on the users they would anyhow have
targeted (Fernandez and Forder, 2007 forthcoming). 
28 That is illustrated by their account of pressure at the front line:
‘our research [in three areas] points to a Catch 22 situation . . .
[there is] so much incoming work that social services
practitioners (as lead agents . . .) have often struggled to take any
single referral beyond the initial stages of assessment and care
planning. On the other hand, the inability first to integrate the
monitoring and review stages and second to provide a
comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach (where appropriate)
almost certainly helps explain the very high re-referral rates and
subsequent work overload. This suggests that focusing on
procedures for joint working and honing the existing system, as
advocated in the single assessment guidance, will not address the
root cause of the problem. This lies in case loads which demand
the processing of clients and patients as quickly and efficiently as
possible and overstretched practitioners who simply do not have
time to act as ‘care managers’ coordinating care and the various
‘specialist assessments’ of other agencies and professionals. As
noted earlier, social services departments are often expected to
operate increasingly close to breaking point.’ Of course, there
has always been great variation – and volatility, for instance in
response to budget changes in related agencies and changes in
grant settlements – in the balance between needs and resources at
the local level, but it is likely that this has been and remains a
fair picture of the situation of a substantial proportion of field
areas at any time (McNally et al., 2003, pp.21–2). See also
Sinclair et al., 1998. 
29 Ritter and Webber argued that the planning context in which they
invented the concept of wickedness was characterised by extreme
technological indeterminacy – social heterogeneity is
incompatible great precision of goals, causality is unclear and so
therefore are the means to achieve goals, 
30 The most highly prioritised goals have been shifted from some
which are well culturally embedded and so pursued with little
prompting by all participants and structurally embedded in field
organisations dominated by them, to goals which are less directly
open to social care influence increasingly in field settings
requiring accommodation to culturally alien values and
assumptions about ends and means. That is likely to weaken
consistency in the relations between resources and outcomes. 
31 Indeed, there seems to have been a tendency among both policy-
makers and academics to have a preoccupation with ‘wickedness’
that would do justice to the devout Massachusetts colonists: to
perceive and pursue it in policy contexts whose symptoms of
wickedness and its causes pale into insignificance compared with
the policy areas for which the wickedness argument was
originally developed. That may have both led to misleading
policy judgment and to the unintended creation of alibis for
under-performance. For instance, more welfare may be produced
if the context is acted upon as if it is substantially
technologically determinate than technologically indeterminate
when there is the evidence that it is the former to a practically
useful degree. 
32 The great diversion of resources and attention to improving the
integration of health and social care had only mixed success
partly because assumptions about time and other preconditions
were too optimistic, the literature suggests. In some cases, like
some of the NHS-led models seeking to reduce acute bed use
among those at high risk using considerable amounts of spending
on social services for older people by CSSRs, it will also require
more effective learning from the experience from CSSR
experience of care management. 
33 The older population is projected to be much more evenly
distributed across the age range. Therefore there will be higher
proportions in the older age group in 2051, with an increase of
two thirds or more in the number of persons aged 85 and over
during the previous two decades (DWP, 2004; Turner, 2004). 
34 Funding reforms were among those advocated for the period
when the window of opportunity was last open, the nineties. The
OECD projected that continuation of the whole range of current
public policies would actually reduce public spending by 2 per
cent over the decade. An academic suggested: ‘failure to find the
resources to make the investment could be . . . an opportunity to
improve the quality of our national life permanently lost’ (Davies
et al., 1990, pp.399; OECD, 1988). Policy makers had an alibi:
as in several other countries, they were too busy developing and
managing reforms to tackle issues with which the policy world is
most familiar and for which it can most readily put tools in
place, only later engaging other issues, often by modifying the
newly created mechanisms: in the British case, supply side
reforms; in the German and Japanese, a social insurance funding
mechanism. It can be debated whether an important opportunity
was lost by not also experimenting with models incorporating
innovations in financing mechanisms with feature to improve
equity, effectiveness and efficiency in the publicly subsidized
real economy of care.
35 In its official response to the DH consultation on its plans to
merge the quality assurance regulators for health and social care,
the CSCI suggested that the new remit was so broad that care
would have to be taken to ensure health issues did not dominate
official focus (Care and Health News, 2007). The announcement
was made by Gordon Brown ahead of the 2005 election in the
context of his battle to reduce red tape.
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